Previous work on the dynamics of conflicts where we see terrorism has tended to focus on whether we see shifts in attack mode following government countermeasures. We contend that many factors other than counterinsurgency can influence whether groups resort to terrorism, including competition between groups, as well as their relationship to public opinion and other political events. Hence, understanding terrorist tactics in prolonged conflicts with multiple actors requires us to consider a more general framework of innovation, imitation, competition and dependence between actors. We use disaggregated data on terrorist attacks, counterterrorism, and public opinion in the Israel-Palestine conflict to jointly evaluate predictions derived from several conventional theories of strategic behavior. We find that the strategic calculus of Palestinian groups is complex and cannot be treated as time invariant. Our results suggest that factors such as the degree of public support, inter-group competition, the anticipation of countermeasures and nontrivial non-violent political payoffs have an observable effect on the strategic behavior of the Palestinian groups, and that structural relationships often are far from constant over time.
Introduction
Terrorism, or the use of violence to create fear for political purposes, has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest, especially after the 11 September 2001 attacks against New York City and Washington, DC, the 11 March 2004 train bombing in Madrid, and the 7 July 2005 London bombings. These recent events have led to a renewed interest in previous work on terrorism and the use of terrorism in other conflicts prior to these attacks. Despite the international nature of these attacks, where Islamist groups attack targets in other industrialized countries, the bulk of terrorist attacks tend to be much more local in character, with groups targeting local governments to advance certain local political goals.
Some observers tend to describe terrorists as "evil" and irrational political or religious fanatics.
However, terrorism is a strategic tool, used for political purposes, rather than merely haphazard or expressive acts (Bell 1990; Enders and Sandler 1993) . Terrorism is very much a "weapon of the weak" and particularly likely to be used in asymmetric conflicts. The resort to terrorism by the weaker side that lacks the capacity for conventional warfare can potentially and to some degree counterbalance the terms of the conflict by substituting fear for real military might. Moreover, the resort to terrorism is not a constant tactical choice. Many groups that have used terrorism at some point have switched to other strategies under other conditions. For example, the African National Congress carried out a number of bombing attacks through its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, explicitly citing the lack of real opportunities for other actions under the South African government, but also lacking the capacity for effective conventional warfare against its opponent.
However, the ANC suspended these operations once the South African government removed the ban on the organization and indicated a real willingness to enter into substantial negotiations.
Statements by terrorist organizations themselves strongly attest to their strategic use of such tactics, both with regards to carrying out attacks and to call for caution. 
Hamdan instructed allied organizations that
The lone suicide martyr method has scored great achievements, but now, as we stand at the threshold of a decisive stage, we must resort to a tactic that brings us the desired results; I therefore tell you not to hurry to exact revenge. We have to be sure our assault is concerted and perfectly orchestrated. Don't waste resources and manpower on small operations.
These and similar statements by other organizations strongly suggest that both the general and specific use of terrorism is often a carefully calculated choice. However, we still know relatively little about the strategic calculus of terrorism. First, existing research has tended to focus exclusively on particular individual factors as driving the resort to terrorism, such as government counterterrorism efforts or its relationship to public opinion, but rarely considered how such factors may interact with one another in shaping the context in which actors chose terrorist tactics.
Second, existing research has tended to simply count violent terrorist attacks and how these frequencies correspond with particular factors, but rarely considered or distinguished between their specific tactical forms (e.g., hostages, arson, etc.) or their severity (i.e., the number of casualties).
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The implicit assumption has thus been that all violent events convey roughly the same information about a group's strategy and goals. But clearly terrorism comes in many forms, and it is known that differences in the degree of severity matter a great deal (Clauset et al. 2007 ). For instance, the political impact of severity is illustrated by how the severe attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington DC, and the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, stimulated much more dramatic political and economic responses than incompetent and non-severe attacks such as Richard Reed's shoe-bombing attempt, or the London copy-cat attacks of 21 July 2001.
In our view, a full understanding of terrorism requires us to look beyond counting incidents to also consider its severity and its strategic character. One piece of this more complete understanding must be to assess a group's strategic choices and constraints -that is, the range of viable options, both violent and non-violent, and the limits to action, perhaps induced by organizational dynamics, its host populace or competition from other groups. Without this understanding, government countermeasures may be less effective than they could be, and scarce resources may be used to protect targets that are unlikely to be attacked and against tactics groups are unlikely to use. In the worse cases, countermeasures may actually be counterproductive, to the extent that they could instead serve to further the terrorist's goals (Mueller 2006 ; see also Ganor 2008) .
In the following, we first review existing work on the resort to terrorism, synthesize key claims and propositions, and expand on why we believe that existing work is too narrowly focused. In order to better understand the context of terrorism we examine the Israel-Palestine conflict, where detailed data exist that allow us to examine a large number of propositions empirically.
Strategy and Terrorism
Previous work on the strategic character of terrorism has focused on several aspects believed to make terrorism more or less likely. Perhaps the best studied of these is the phenomenon of strategic substitution following state counter-terrorism efforts (Landes 1978; Sandler 1993, 2004) , where groups change tactics after the state's actions increase the cost of the current terrorist tactic relative to some alternative. For instance, a vector autoregression analysis of the relative attack-mode frequencies bracketing the introduction of metal detectors in U.S. airports lends support to the hypothesis that the detectors decreased the frequency of airplane hijackings, but increased the frequency of other kinds of hostage situations (Enders and Sandler 1993) .
Other studies have highlighted the political rationale or advantages accruing to groups from the use of terrorist tactics. Pape (2003) , for example, argues that suicide attacks are most typically used in asymmetric conflicts over territory, since they have proven to be a useful approach to wear out the resolve of the occupying forces, which eventually may lead to their withdrawal from the disputed territory. Brym and Araj (2006) argue that the impetus for terrorist attacks arise from the desire to retaliate against government repression (see also Araj 2008) . In this sense, terrorism can become more frequent and severe through action-reaction dynamics and escalating conflicts between the parties.
2 Bloom (2004) highlights how suicide attacks can become popular as these are thought to serve the dual purpose of severely wounding the enemy and raising the public profile of the attacking group.
Other researchers have suggested that conflicts where there are multiple and potentially competing groups on the insurgent side can display very different dynamics and prospects for termination than groups where there is a single organization, operating as a hierarchical organization with a central leadership (Cunningham 2006) . In the context of terrorism, attacks by one group can serve the role of a "spoiler" to prevent other groups from engaging in non-violent political tactics like peace talks (Kydd and Walter 2002) . Moreover, groups may resort to terrorism as part of their competition with other groups (Bloom 2004 ).
Many previous studies have evaluated propositions relating these factors to terrorism empirically. However, although such studies have shed considerable light on the strategic character of terrorism, they have not typically considered more than a single aspect of the strategic calculus of terrorism. As such, our understanding of how groups actually behave in complex conflicts remains limited. In this paper, we wish to consider substitution in light of counterterrorism efforts jointly with competition between groups and the role of public opinion. Our basic premises are (1) that terrorist organizations are innovative agents, rather than passive actors that merely adapt to government countermeasures, and (2) when a conflict is characterized by several terrorist organizations, their actions are not independent, and they may compete with each other for political support or learn from each other.
Moreover, existing empirical research has often looked at highly aggregated measures of terrorism, often yearly counts by country, despite the fact that large databases of individual events, e.g., the ITERATE data set (Mickolus et al. 2004) or the MIPT data set (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 2006), allow researchers to disaggregate trends by actors and time in more insightful ways. However, comparative analysis of a large set of conflicts can be difficult if the strategic calculus of terrorism is complex and sensitive to other features of the political context. In particular, the relationships may not be stable across conflicts or over time, and may depend on idiosyncratic political events specific to each conflict, which may be difficult to compare across conflicts. As an alternative, we here propose to test and consider the scope for conventional theories within the context of a single conflict, where we can get more detailed data and carefully examine the political context. We use empirical data on recent events in the IsraelPalestine conflict as a model system of the context where terrorism is used, which we in turn hope will allow us to make progress to extend our understanding to more general theories of terrorism.
We will comment in the following section on why we believe that the Israel-Palestine conflict is an appropriate model system. First, however, we would like to briefly comment on our empirical approach. We note that our approach is explicitly data-centric, in the sense that we do not posit any complete mathematical models of terrorist behavior from which we derive formal propositions, but instead draw on empirical data from a number of sources to evaluate a number of plausible and potentially competing conjectures. Although model-centric approaches can be a powerful way to test specific theories, it is unclear whether it is possible to simultaneously model the several theories mentioned above, and one might question whether these theories are sufficiently welldeveloped and specified that they are best approached formally. Moreover, many key features often cannot be observed directly. For many potentially important factors such as the financial stability of a group and its recruitment concerns, data are either scarce, of poor quality, or nonexistent. In many conflicts, even the most basic data on the public support of terrorist activities do not exist. In contrast, a data-centric approach provides some flexibility in evaluating theories primarily through observable characteristics of conflicts, i.e., features that are quantifiable and measurable, and allows us to discover novel statistical patterns or relationships not embodied in current theoretical explanations. The drawback of this approach, of course, is that it leaves some room for ambiguity in terms of confounding effects. Still, we find that focusing our attention on the observable characteristics of the conflict in this case allows us to draw several reasonably clear conclusions about the strategic behavior of Palestinian groups. In particular, we find that factors such as inter-group competition and the degree of public support seem to have a strong influence, often simultaneously, on the strategic use of violence by the Palestinian groups. Further, we find that substitution, public support and spoiler effects are all considerably more complicated than previously thought.
Substitution and Competition in the Israel-Palestine Conflict
The Israel-Palestine conflict is an ideal conflict to examine strategic behavior for several reasons.
First, the Israel-Palestine conflict is intrinsically important, and has given rise to a very high share 
A Conceptual Model of Israeli and Palestinian Interactions
To help the reader place our empirical analyses within a unified context, we introduce a simple single actor, see for example Goldstein et al. (2001) , thus obscuring any competitive behavior on the Palestinian side -an abstraction that is reasonable only if separate groups apparently pursue a common goal utilizing coordinated behavior. In this study, we will treat different named groups in our data as separate actors.
Several propositions on when we should expect to see a resort to terrorist activities can be stated in terms of this conceptual model. The arguments about substitution following counterrorism would suggest that terrorists primarily respond to counterattacks by the government and change their behavior accordingly. In contrast, the escalation and retaliation argument implies that we should see an increase in attacks following countermeasures. Arguments about group competition imply that groups should resort to attacks when these can be politically advantageous. Actors may emulate other groups and switch to more lethal forms of attacks when these have proven advantageous to other groups. 5 Moreover, we would expect there be some relationship between public opinion and the use of specific attack modes. The fact that these effects can all appear simultaneously, however, means that we must be sensitive to the potential complexity of the conflict.
Relationships may change over time, and other changes in the political context may induce shifts in strategies. With this conceptual model, and the corresponding predictions, in hand, we now turn to empirical analysis of these expectations.
Empirical data
We draw our terrorist incident data from the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Terrorism (2006) The MIPT database contains both transnational and purely domestic events, and has been used in several recent studies of terrorism (Bogen and Jones 2006; Clauset et al. 2007 ). The perhaps better known and more commonly used ITERATE data set (Mickolus et al. 2004 ) is limited to transnational events. Here, we consider only those events that occurred in the conflict region itself -i.e., Israel, and Gaza or the West Bank. 7 This yields a total of 3,017 events; 81.6% of which have occurred since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. When it becomes relevant which of the 48 groups is associated with a particular event, we restrict our analysis to Fatah, PFLP, Hamas, PIJ, and the catchall group "Unknown/Other", as these account for over 90% of the Israel-Palestine events in the database; in terms of violent events, these five can thus be 6 Since the initiation of this project, the original MIPT database has become defunct, and the data are no longer available online. Our understanding is that the MIPT data eventually will be merged with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) managed by the START program, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, at the University of Maryland, College Park. 7 There are several area-specific data collections, including collections by B'tselem (www.btselem.org/English/) and the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (www.ict.org.il). We choose the MIPT data set over these because using a global data source will allow future research to more easily make comparisons between the Israel-Palestine conflict and other conflicts using similar coding criteria. To examine the relative popularity of different terrorist groups, we draw on public opinion data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (2007), which routinely conducts polls on a variety of issues in different areas of the Palestinian territory. 9 Of the large amount of data in these polls, we focus specifically on the questions asked between 1994 and 2006 concerning how much support individuals give to Fatah, PFLP, Hamas, and PIJ respectively.
To examine the extent to which interactions between Palestinian groups are competitive or generally cooperative, we draw on the Levant data, which are derived by the Kansas Event Data System 10 from automated coding of English-language news reports. These data identify specific events where a particular actor-i.e., the source-carries out an identifiable action against another actor-i.e., the target-(see Schrodt and Gerner (1994) for further discussion on coding event data). For simplicity, we focus primarily on the relationship between Hamas and Fatah here, and 8 We will examine the named organizations in the MPIT data as the key actors, and assume that actions explicitly carried or acknowledged out by particular organizations can be treated as planned or at least endorsed by a central elite or leadership. Pedahzur and Perliger (2006) argue that many suicide attacks often are planned by local activist, and that participation does not always follow clear organizational lines. However, focusing only on acknowledged or claimed events makes it less problematic to treat the organizations as individual actors. In the analyses reported, we do not include attacks by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) as attacks by Fatah. The AAMB is often linked to Fatah, but is not consistently endorsed by Fatah. Combining the AAMB and Fatah's attacks, however, does not notably alter the results reported here. 9 The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (2006) Goldstein (1992) , which ranges from -10 for the most conflictual behavior to 10 for increasingly cooperative events. These events can then be summed over a period for an aggregate measure of relations between parties.
Here, we aggregate by week, and assign a score of zero to weeks with no recorded events. 11 We code actors in the Levant data by the following approach: We identify PLO/Fatah by the actor codes PSEGOVFTA, PALPLO, PSEGOV, PSEREBAAM, PSEELI, PSECOP (i.e., Palestininian government, PLO, Fatah, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigape, Palestinian elites, and the Palestinian Police), while the events involving Hamas are labelled PSEREBHMS in the Levant data. The events recorded by KEDS will primarily reflect the statements of acts of elites, rather than individual rank and file members, but this is appropriate given our focus on organizations.
Attacks and countermeasures
We begin by considering the relationship between terrorist attacks and countermeasures, and the accuracy of the conventional theory of substitution. Recall that this theory suggests that the frequency of subsequent attacks should depend mainly on the state's countermeasures.
During the al-Aqsa Intifada (September 2000 to the present), Israel's active counter-terrorism efforts fall into two qualitatively different strategies. First, prior to the end of 2003, we find that changes in Israel's activity level in a given month are strongly anti-correlated with changes in the number of suicide incidents in the previous month (r = −0.47, p < 0.01).
13 That is, during this period, we suggest that Israel directly reacted to Palestinian attacks, effectively pursuing a tit-for-tat strategy, where one actor escalates their activity in response to the other's recent activity ( Figure 2a) . Indeed, the cross-correlation function (CCF) of Israel's activities to the number of suicide attacks peaks strongly at a τ = −1 month lag (Figure 2a inset), indicating that Israel's response rate was most highly correlated with the Palestinian suicide attack rate from the previous month. However, we do not have a perfect tit-for-tat cycle, which would lead to a pattern of mutual reciprocity, as the Palestinian side does not appear to directly respond to Israeli counter-measures.
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Since there is no reciprocity or little evidence of deterrent effect on the Palestinian side, counterterrorist efforts were not able to limit escalation of the conflict. This pattern of reprisals runs counter to the conventional assumption that increased counter-terrorism activity can only suppress future terrorist activity (Sandler et al. 1983; Rosendorff and Sandler 2004) . 15 Further, we find that during this time, the Palestinian groups pursued a relatively singleminded strategy -suicide attacks -as their response to Israeli counterattacks. In contrast to the temporal dynamics of suicide 13 Throughout this paper, we report two-tailed p-values from a standard t-test for the significance of the Pearson correlation r between series.
14 For a more detailed explanation of this pattern of reprisals in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3556809.stm. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) find similar results, using different data on terrorist events.
15 Brym and Araj (2006) find support for retribution from Israeli actions as a motive for suicide attacks, based on data on assassinations of Palestinian insurgents. entailment is important, e.g., the case of metal detectors studied by Enders and Sandler (1993) , it seems unlikely that it is the most important factor in all situations. In the next two sections, we consider alternative explanations, outside the conventional theory of strategic substitution, for these statistical features of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and give empirical evidence suggesting that several other factors are at least as important in influencing the behavior of the Palestinian groups as the actions of Israel.
Competition, imitation, and the role of public opinion
To understand the first of the two statistical features, we now consider the use of suicide attacks by individual Palestinian groups. Bloom's (2004) Arafat insisted that "we will . . . exert the utmost efforts to stop the bloodshed of our people and of the Israeli people." 17 However, the coincidence of Fatah's low approval ratings in 2002 with its adoption of the suicide tactic (Figure 3a) (Figure 3b) . Thus, Bloom's hypothesis seems inconsistent, or at least incomplete -why did public support for Hamas not increase after its first campaign of suicide attacks in the early-to-mid 1990s? To resolve this puzzle, we suggest a slight modification of Bloom's hypothesis: in order for a group to get a lift in approval by using a particular tactic, be it suicide or otherwise, the public must support its use. As a corollary, we expect that if the public supports the use of a particular violent tactic, a group that can successfully employ it against Israel will receive a lift in approval, provided it is seen as a viable contender. From this perspective, it should be no surprise that Hamas gained little support from its early attacks because public support suggested above, is not completely consistent with the empirical data -the use of suicide attacks cannot alone improve a group's public standing, even when the public generally supports the use of these tactics.
One potential explanation of this inconsistency is that only a plausible challenger to a dominant organization, such as Hamas challenging Fatah, can enhance its public standing by engaging in particular forms of dramatic and high impact terrorism. In such a situation, the dominant organization is likely to try to contain the growing popularity of the challenger -and may have some success -by emulating the latter's methods, thereby removing the apparent novelty or distinctiveness of the challengers' strategy that resonated with the public. Less established and more obscure groups, however, do not necessarily gain similar benefits from resorting to a particular tactic, even if it is a popular one. More generally, the incentives for resorting to extreme terrorism may be very different for "large" groups that are generally well known than for "small" groups that the public is less familiar with, unless such small groups first manage to establish themselves in a position as a plausible challenger or central player. In the case of Hamas, its growth into a large organization seems due partly to its provision of public goods, something that the PIJ has never done. Thus, Hamas's rise to power in Palestine may not have been caused by its use of suicide bombings; rather, its success as a large organization may have encouraged other groups to emulate its violent tactics.
Election-driven behavior
We now turn to the second unexplained statistical feature in our analysis of attacks and countermeasures: the intermittent but distinctive spikes in the frequency of non-suicide attacks (Figure 2b In agreement with this interpretation, we note that in the vicinity of the legislative election in 2006 -the first that Hamas did not boycott -we see virtually no attacks by Hamas, either suicide or non-suicide. 21 Another plausible factor influencing Hamas's behavior in this timeframe is the incentive to signal its ability to control the use of violence to both the Palestinian and Israeli audiences. In prior time periods, the Palestinian Authority's peace negotiations with Israel were disrupted by suicide attacks. Kydd and Walter (2002) suggest that this behavior implies that terrorism is used as a strategic "spoiler," whereby attacks are used to violate Israel's trust in the Palestinian side's ability to control its extremist factions. Hamas's abandonment of suicide attack thus may signal authority over its extremist factions and, more generally, its ability to control violence and engage in effective internal policing. This control could serve to increase Hamas's appeal as an effective political organization to both Palestinians and Israelis, demonstrating to Palestinians that it can guarantee security, while signaling to Israel that it will be negotiating with a party able to control the violence. Certainly in a political environment where multiple groups compete to coerce Israeli policies, demonstrating organizational control by freezing the use of a particular tactic, which may be the most effective (and, by extension, the most detrimental to Israeli interests), seems like a reasonably attractive strategy.
Finally, we observe that the second spike of non-lethal, non-suicide attacks, in mid-2005 was largely in response to Israel's planned evacuation of 25 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.
Hamas launched a large number of mortar and Qassam rocket attacks at about half of these settlements, as well as at a few that were not being evacuated, but largely inaccurately. In light of our previous discussion, this behavior appears to be largely symbolic -again demonstrating Hamas's military strength, but not in a way that would stimulate a vigorous response from Israel, or halt the pull out.
Substitution and competition in terrorism
In the preceding sections, we gave several empirical examples from the Israel-Palestine conflict to illustrate the idea that the conventional notions of strategic substitution in terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2004) , which locate actions by the state as the central driving force, is an insufficient explanation of the full strategic calculus of terrorism. In particular, the conventional theory ignores the internal dynamics of the Palestinian side. If these findings can be generalized, then we expect to observe qualitatively similar behavior in other regional conflicts with a heterogeneous mixture of actors, to the extent that the specific political context and phase of the conflict allows. To make our findings more generally applicable, we now extrapolate our analysis of the Israel-Palestine conflict into a set of stylized conjectures about the features that we expect will be influential in the resort to terrorism, and the character of violence, for conflicts with multiple non-state actors. Here, we provide brief qualitative evaluation of these general principles, and leave their more systematic or quantitative evaluation for the future.
First, we should consider whether relations between actors within each side of the conflict are primarily competitive, or cooperative. In the former case, a resort to terrorism may be more likely as less extreme groups face competition from more extreme factions over scarce resources such as public support, recruits, financing, media attention, etc. Likewise, a competitive atmosphere may make negotiations between key antagonists difficult, as marginal groups on either side can undermine these actions through violence (a la the "spoiler" effect of Kydd and Walter).
An important extension of this observation is that the cohesion within groups may also be vitally important. Third, we conjecture that the degree of alignment between public opinion and the ideology of the group(s) is inversely related to the frequency and severity of attacks. That is, when a group becomes accepted as representatives for a large number of constituents, it also has a greater incentive to engage in policing activity to prevent violent attacks that may stimulate counterproductive or overly harsh responses from the other side. Furthermore, because such groups are sensitive to public opinion, they will likely be more cautious in attacking targets that are considered illegitimate among potential or existing supporters. the severity of attacks is a strategic consideration independent of their incidence, and we would suggest that it is likely to be subject to many of the factors we have introduced here.
Conclusions
At face value, the conventional theories of the strategic calculus of terrorism -such as strategic substitution, Bloom's ideas about the political utility of suicide attacks to organizations, and the conventional assumption that counterterrorism activities can only decrease the likelihood of future attacks -seem entirely reasonable. However, they have mainly been explored in relatively narrow contexts, and thus their generality has not yet been established. The Israel-Palestine conflict, due to its long and well documented history and, more importantly, relatively plentiful empirical data, is thus a model conflict by which we can test hypotheses such as these. That being said, we consider our findings here to be preliminary; a comparative study that considers the statistics of many different conflicts would likely settle many of these questions, and better identify the circumstances under which these conventional theories apply. Still, our analyses allow us to draw several cautionary conclusions.
First, the evidence supporting the conventional notion of strategic substitution (Landes 1978; Sandler 1993, 2004) as an explanation for changes in attack modes is not very strong in the Israel-Palestine conflict -among the data studied here, the only place where it seems a plausible explanation is in Israel's efforts from late 2003 and onward to reduce the number of suicide attacks by the Palestinian groups. From this perspective, the conventional theory is surely incomplete, with the critical missing piece being an explanation of when strategic substitution is a reasonable hypothesis and when it is not. Our finding that Palestinian groups behave in ways that are independent of Israel's actions, and in particular that they seem to be motivated at least as much by inter-group dynamics as by Israel's actions, suggests that the more general theory should likely account for whether the internal dynamics of the conflict are competitive or cooperative.
Second, we find that the conventional notion in counterterrorism that increased countermeasures can only reduce the frequency of future attacks (Sandler et al. 1983; Rosendorff and Sandler 2004 ) is flawed. As evidenced by the tit-for-tat behavior of Palestinian groups using suicide attacks during the Second Intifada (Figure 2a ) some countermeasures can actually increase the frequency of future attacks, perhaps by implicitly engaging the terrorist organizations in a dominance competition. Thus, it seems that the choice of which counterterrorism actions to take must be made carefully, so as not to encourage such reciprocal behavior. Furthermore, less common approaches, such as fostering a political path for violent organizations, may be highly successful ways to reduce the frequency of suicide attacks, and perhaps even other types of violence. Hamas's behavior after the decision to hold legislative elections in 2006, for instance, demonstrates that such non-violent paths may be an effective means of tempering the character of violence in a conflict. Hence, a more comprehensive approach to both active counterterrorism and other strategies like political incorporation that accounts for the internal dynamics influencing violent groups' activities is needed.
Third, the evidence for Bloom's (2004) notion that suicide attacks serve to raise the public standing of the attacking group is marginal. In the Israel-Palestine conflict, suicide attacks per se are sometimes associated with measurable improvements to a group's public standing (e.g., in the case of Fatah), but this is not the typical case. For Hamas in the early 1990s, and for PFLP and PIJ during the Second Intifada, the use of suicide attacks did not produce the predicted gains. Thus, Bloom's hypothesis is incomplete, and marginal groups may employ suicide attacks for different reasons than larger and more established groups like Fatah and, since 2000, Hamas.
Fourth, a competitive environment among terrorism-inclined groups is a crucial factor in understanding, and likely forecasting, their strategic behavior. For instance, a weakened mainstream group may adopt the tendencies of more extremist but marginal groups, if it feels the public will support them for it; a situation that seems to well describe Fatah's response to Hamas's growing popularity ( Figure 3a) .
Finally, our findings highlight the importance of the internal dynamics of the terrorism-inclined side of a conflict. For policy makers, this point suggests that devising strategies to deal with one type of attack may prove fruitless if the internal dynamics of the opposing side shift for unanticipated reasons. But, without public support, terrorism-inclined groups often cease to exist. Thus, ideal protective measures should not aggravate existing internal tensions in a way that stimulates a productive competition for public support.
In closing, we note that this study shows the utility in stepping away from the model-centric perspective on terrorism to use a more data-centric approach to learn about complex conflicts with multiple actors. Although the specific political context and actors will undoubtedly vary across conflicts, we believe it is possible to formulate organizing principles about the dynamics of strategic substitution and competition in terrorism that can be applied to other conflicts.
